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Deduction modulo is a way to combine computation and deduction in proofs, by apply-
ing the inference rules of a deductive system (e.g. natural deduction or sequent calculus)
modulo some congruence that we assume here to be presented by a set of rewrite rules.
Using deduction modulo is equivalent to proving in a theory corresponding to the rewrite
rules, and leads to proofs that are often shorter and more readable. However, cuts may be
not admissible anymore.
We deﬁne a new system, the unfolding sequent calculus, and prove its equivalencewith
the sequent calculus modulo, especially w.r.t. cut-free proofs. It permits to show that it is
even undecidable to know if cuts can be eliminated in the sequent calculus modulo a given
rewrite system.
Then, to recover the cut admissibility, we propose a procedure to complete the rewrite
systemsuch that the sequent calculusmodulo the resulting systemadmits cuts. This is done
by generalizing the Knuth–Bendix completion in a non-trivial way, using the framework of
abstract canonical systems.
These results enlighten the entanglement between computation and deduction, and
the power of abstract completion procedures. They also provide an effective way to ob-
tain systems admitting cuts, therefore extending the applicability of deduction modulo in
automated theorem proving.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Proof assistants like Coq, PVS or Isabelle-HOL are now well mastered systems both from the conceptual and implemen-
tation points of view. They allow for the development of large and even very large proofs like the one of the four-color
theorem [1]. They allow also for a broad use of these techniques, making computer-aided proof development an approach
now in use at the industrial level, for instance for making the formal proof of security issues of java card [2,3].
This important activity in the use of current proof assistants enlightens the crucial lack of computing power easily
combinable with the deductive capabilities of such systems. If the complementarity and interaction between computation
and deduction is identiﬁed since at least Henri Poincaré, its formalization as deduction modulo [4] is an appropriate way to
present ﬁrst-order logic as well as any logic in general.
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Deduction modulo should therefore be at the heart of proof assistants and proof search methods, either implicitly or
explicitly (see for instance [4–7]) and getting a deep understanding of its logical behavior is of prime interest either for
theoretical or practical purposes.
In deduction modulo, computations are modeled by a congruence relation between terms and between propositions.
The logical deductions are done modulo this congruence that is represented by a rewrite relation over ﬁrst-order terms and
propositions. This permits to construct proofs that are oftenmore readable, because the really deductive steps appear clearly,
and also shorter, as was shown by [8]. A ﬁrst interesting question is to know which theories can be represented by such a
congruence. It turns out, as we show in this paper, that any ﬁnitely presented ﬁrst-order theory can be transformed into such
a rewrite relation, as far as one is only concernedwith classical logic. Nevertheless, the additional expressiveness capabilities
added by the congruence entails that the Hauptsatz, i.e. the fact that cuts are not needed to build proofs, is no longer true.
This can be seen in particular from an example derived from Crabbé’s proof of the non-normalization of Zermelo’s theory
[9] (see for instance [4] and Footnote 2 below). And indeed the gap is important as we are proving in this paper that the
admissibility of the cut rule is undecidable when one works modulo.
But cut elimination is fundamental for several related reasons: ﬁrst, it implies the consistency of the logic, and in the case
of deduction modulo the consistency of the theory associated with the rewrite relation. Second, it entails the subformula
property,1 so that the search space is, in a sense, limited. The tableaumethod is based on this fact, and for instance TaMed [7,
10], a tableau method based on deduction modulo, is shown to be complete only for cut-free systems. Third, it has been
shown by Hermant [11] that the proof search method for deduction modulo ENAR [4]—which generalizes resolution and
narrowing—is equivalent to the cut-free fragment of deduction modulo, i.e. a sequent has a cut-free proof in deduction
modulo if and only if ENAR can ﬁnd a proof. ENAR is therefore complete if and only if the cut rule is admissible. This is also
the case in the more recently introduced Polarized Resolution Modulo [12].
So on the one hand, we like to have a powerful congruence but this may be at the price of losing cut admissibility. How
can we get both? It has been shown by Dowek [13] that cut admissibility is equivalent to the conﬂuence of the rewrite
system, provided only ﬁrst-order terms are rewritten. In case the term rewrite system we are considering is not conﬂuent,
we can apply standard (a.k.a. Knuth–Bendix [14]) completion to get an equivalent term rewrite system which is conﬂuent,
and that way, we regain the cut admissibility. It is however no longer true when propositions are also rewritten, and the cut
admissibility is in that case a stronger notion than conﬂuence. Dowek wanted therefore to build a generalized completion
procedure whose input is a rewrite system over ﬁrst-order terms and atomic propositions and computing a rewrite system
such that theassociated sequent calculusmoduloadmits cut.Heproposed sucha completionprocedure for thequantiﬁer-free
case [15], based on the construction of a model for the theory associated with the rewrite system.
To solve this question, including unlimited use of quantiﬁers, we use here a quite different approach based on the notion
of abstract canonical system and inference introduced by [16,17]. This abstract framework is based on a proof ordering whose
goal is to apprehend the notion of proof quality from which the notions of canonicity, completeness and redundancy follow
up. It is shown to be well adapted to existing completion procedures such as ground completion [18] and standard (a.k.a.
Knuth–Bendix [14]) completion [19].
To present the general idea of our approach, let us consider the simple example of Crabbé’s axiom [9] A ⇔ B ∧ ¬A.2 Can
we ﬁnd, for the sequent calculusmodulo the associated rewrite system A → B ∧ ¬A, a provable sequent without any cut-free
proof? Indeed, let us try to build a minimal example. We will show in Proposition 39 that such a proof, in its simplest form,
is necessarily of the shape:
....
A, B ∧ ¬A 
A  ↑-l
....
 B ∧ ¬A, A
 A ↑-r
 Cut(A)
where the rules labeled “↑-r” and “↑-l” allow to unfold the oriented axioms, respectively, on the right or on the left. In order to
validate this proof pattern, we have to check if it is possible to close both sides of the proof tree, possibly adding informations
in the initial sequent.
First, we can trivially close the left part as follows:
A, B  A Axiom
A, B,¬A  ¬-l
A, B ∧ ¬A  ∧-l .
1 In the case of deduction modulo, the intuitive notion of subformula must take the considered rewrite relation into account.
2 In Crabbé’s manuscript, A represents rs ∈ rs and B rs ∈ s where rs is {x ∈ s : x 	∈ x}. Then, there is a proof of rs 	∈ s in Zermelo’s set theory that is not
normalizing.
142 G. Burel, C. Kirchner / Information and Computation 208 (2010) 140–164
Second, to close the right part, we must have a proof in the form:
 B, A
A  A Axiom
 ¬A, A ¬-r
 B ∧ ¬A, A ∧-r .
To enforce the proof of  B, A, we must add either A or B to the left of the sequent, and we only have to consider B, since we
have cut around A. We obtain the critical proof:
A, B  A Axiom
A, B,¬A  ¬-l
B, A, B ∧ ¬A  ∧-l
B, A  ↑-l
B  B, A Axiom
B, A  A Axiom
B  ¬A, A ¬-r
B  B ∧ ¬A, A ∧-r
B  A ↑-r
B  Cut(A) .
We can also easily show that there are no cut-free proof of B , simply because no inference rule is applicable to it except
Cut. If we want to have a cut-free proof, we need to make B reducible by the congruence, hence the idea to complete the
initial system with a new rule which is a logical consequence of the current system. In our case, we must therefore add the
rule B → ⊥.
With this new rule, we will show that there are no more critical proofs and that therefore the sequent calculus modulo
the proposition rewrite system{
A → B ∧ ¬A
B → ⊥
admits the cut rule and has the same expressive power as the initial one.
The study of this question indeed reveals general properties of the sequent calculus modulo and our contributions are
the following:
• We deﬁne several variants of the sequent calculus modulo more adapted to prove the results of the paper (Section 2.2):
the unfolding sequent calculus allows only atomic propositions to be rewritten, step by step; in addition, the polarized
unfolding sequent calculus separates which rules can be applied to a proposition on the left and on the right of a sequent;
both variants behave the sameway, especiallyw.r.t. cut-free proofs, as the asymmetric sequent calculusmodulo of Dowek
[13], which in turn is equivalent to the original version of the sequent calculus modulo by Dowek, Hardin and Kirchner
[4] when the rewrite system is conﬂuent.
• We prove, using a semantical argument, that it is undecidable to know if the unfolding sequent calculus associated with
a given proposition rewrite system admits cuts (Theorem 15).
• We show how to transform a ﬁnite set of axioms into a ﬁnite rewrite system, such that the theory induced by the set of
axioms is the same as the one proved by the classical sequent calculus modulo the rewrite system (Section 4).
• Weprovide an appropriateNoetherian ordering on the proofs of the unfolding sequent calculus. This ordering allows us to
seton theproof spaceofunfoldingsequentcalculusastructureofabstract canonical system(Theorem37). Wecharacterize
the critical proofs in deduction modulo as simple cuts (Proposition 39). We establish a precise correspondence between
the limit of a completion process and a cut-free sequent calculus (Theorem 41), therefore bypassing the undecidability
of the cut admissibility in the same way as standard completion circumvents the undecidability of the conﬂuence of a
rewrite system.
• We show the applicability of the general results, in particular on sequent calculus modulo rewrite systems involving
quantiﬁers, therefore generalizing all previously known results such as the ones of Dowek [15].
As an important by-product of these results, we demonstrate the expressive power of abstract canonical systems (ACS for
short).
The next section presents basic notions on rewriting and introduces the variants of sequent calculi modulo that are used
in the paper, proving their equivalence, in particular concerning cut admissibility. In Section 3, we show the undecidability of
the cut admissibility in deduction modulo. The rest of the paper is therefore dedicated to ways to circumvent this. Section 4
describes an algorithm which transforms ﬁnitely presented ﬁrst-order theories into rewrite systems such that the sequent
calculus modulo proves the theory. It exhibits three important properties of the algorithm (Properties 16, 17 and 19) that
are enough to deﬁne the completion procedure detailed in Section 5. This procedure is based on the framework of the ACS,
which is recalled in Section 5.1. The unfolding sequent calculus is shown to be an instance of this framework (Section 5.2).
This allows us in Section 5.3 to characterize the critical proofs of deduction modulo and to set-up the completion process as
the appropriate (and indeed non-trivial) instance of the abstract completion process. We conclude after presenting in more
details Crabbé’s example as well as several examples involving quantiﬁers.
This paper is a profoundly revised and extended version of the paper presented at LFCS’07 [20] and it includes detailed
proofs, examples and motivations.
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2. Deduction modulo
2.1. Rewritings
We deﬁne here how propositions are rewritten in deduction modulo.
Bases on rewriting can be found in [21]. We present here brieﬂy what we need for this paper to be self-contained, mainly
by introducing notations. We denote by T (, V) the set of ﬁrst-order terms built from a signature  and a set of variables V .
An atomic proposition is given by a predicate symbol A of arity n and by n terms t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (, V). It is denoted A(t1, . . . , tn).
Propositions can be built using the following grammar3:
P != A | ¬P | P ∧ P | P ∨ P | P ⇒ P | ∀x. P | ∃x. P
where A ranges over atomic propositions and x over variables. P ⇔ Q will be used as a syntactic sugar for (P ⇒ Q ) ∧ (Q ⇒ P),
aswell as
∧
 forP1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pn;
∨
 forP1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pn and¬ for¬P1, . . . ,¬Pnwhen = P1, . . . , Pn. Freevariablesof aproposition
and substitutions are deﬁned as usual. The replacement of a variable x by a term t in a proposition P is denoted by {t/x}P. A
position in a term or a proposition t is a path in the tree representing t. The subterm or subproposition t|p of t at position p is
the term or proposition represented by the subtree of t whose root is the last node of p. The replacement in t of the subterm
t|p by s is denoted by t[s]p.
A term rewrite rule is the pair of terms l, r such that all free variables of r appear in l. It is denoted l → r. A term rewrite
system is a set of term rewrite rules.
A term s can be rewritten to a term t by a term rewrite rule l → r if there exists some substitution σ such that σ l = s and
σ r = t. This is extended to all terms, and then to all propositions by congruence.
A proposition rewrite rule is the pair of an atomic proposition A and a proposition P, such that all free variables of P appear
in A. It is denoted A → P. A proposition rewrite system is a set of proposition rewrite rules.
An atomic proposition A can be rewritten to a proposition P by a proposition rewrite rule B → Q if there exists some
substitution σ such that σB = A and σQ = P. This is extended to all propositions by congruence. It should be noted that the
proposition rewrite relation should be seen, at least at ﬁrst approximation, as an equivalence between propositions, and not
as an implication: we will see that proving using A → P is the same as proving with the extra assumption A ⇔ P.
A rewrite systemwill be the combination of a term rewrite system and a proposition rewrite system. In the following, the
term rewrite system used in addition to all the proposition rewrite systems we will consider is ﬁxed. It is supposed to be
terminating and conﬂuent and is denoted RT (,V).
We denote by P −→
R
Q the fact that P can be rewritten to Q in the rewrite system R in one step. R may be omitted if it is
clear from the context.
+−→
R
(resp.
∗−→
R
) is the transitive (resp. reﬂexive transitive) closure of this rewrite relation.
The subformula relation  is the least transitive relation such that:
• P  Pi (i = 1,2) if P = P1 ∧ P2, P = P1 ∨ P2 or P = ¬P1;
• P  {t/x}Q if P = ∀x. Q or P = ∃x. Q ;
• P  Q if P −→
RT (,V)
Q ;
for all terms t, variables x and propositions P, Q , P1, P2. It is well-founded: the lexicographic combination of the comparison
of the number of connectors and quantiﬁers in the propositions and the relation −→
RT (,V)
contains : if P  Q , then either P
contains more connectors and quantiﬁer than Q (RT (,V) rewrites only terms, so it cannot add connectors or quantiﬁers),
or as much and in that case P
+−→
RT (,V)
Q . As we know that RT (,V) terminates, the lexicographic combination is well-founded.
Note that this is not the subformula relation that we are talking about in Footnote 1: for the subformula property to hold
we need to also include proposition rewriting, in which case the wellfoundedness may be lost even for terminating rewrite
systems (for instance for A(c) → ∃x. A(x)).
2.2. Sequent calculi modulo
Sequent calculi modulo can be seen as extensions of the sequent calculus of Gentzen [22]. We will use the denom-
inations of Gallier [23]. There exist several variations of sequent calculi modulo, depending on whether rewrite steps
are explicit or not, or whether they are applied to atomic propositions only or not. We propose here two variants, the
unfolding sequent calculus and the polarized unfolding sequent calculus. We link them with other variants deﬁned by
Dowek [13,15].
A sequent is a pair of multisets of propositions ,. It is denoted by   . The sets of all sequents is denoted S . For a
sequent   , if x1, . . . , xn are the free variables of ,, we denote P(  ) the proposition ∀x1, . . . , xn.
(∧
 ⇒∨).
3 != is used for deﬁnitions.
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Fig. 1. Unfolding sequent calculus.
In Fig. 1 we present the inference rules of the unfolding sequent calculus, which is an extension of the system G4 of Kleene
[24] with unfolding rules that apply a rewrite rule to an atomic proposition. Proofs are trees labeled by sequents built using
these rules, and where all leaves are Axioms. The root sequent is called the conclusion. In the following, a double horizontal
bar will mean several applications of an inference rule. A proof is said to be built in the proposition rewrite system R if all ↑-l
and ↑-r steps use only rules that appear in R ∪ RT (,V).
Cut(P) permits essentially to extend the proof search space with the proposition P. Logical Rules decompose some propo-
sition which is called principal. Unfolding Rules, that do not appear in Gentzen’s sequent calculus, introduce proposition
rewriting into the proof system. They are parametrized by a rewrite rule. Note that only atomic propositions are rewritten,
in one step. It can also be remarked that the Unfolding Rules contain an implicit contraction. This is needed to prove that
contractions are admissible in the Cut-free unfolding sequent calculus (see Lemma 5 below), even when the rewrite system
is conﬂuent, as shown by proving Amodulo the rule A → A ⇒ B.
Deﬁnition 1 (Cut admissibility). A proposition rewrite system R is said to admit Cut if for all sequents s ∈ S , s has a proof in
R if and only if s has a proof in Rwithout using Cut.
It is well-known (Gentzen’s Hauptsatz [22], or more accurately [13, Proposition 8] because of RT (,V)) that ∅ admits Cut.
The unfolding sequent calculus is slightly different from the asymmetric sequent calculus modulo of [13], which consists
in applying identity and logical rules modulo the rewrite system. For instance, it contains the following inference rules
, P  Q, Axiom P
∗−→R ∗←−Q
, Q     P,
, R   ⇒ -l R
∗−→ P⇒Q
.
Theasymmetric sequent calculusmoduloalso containsexplicit contractionandweakening inference rules.Unfolding sequent
calculus is to the asymmetric sequent calculus modulo what natural deduction with folding/unfolding rules is to natural
deduction modulo (see [25]). We will show that they are equivalent, in particular w.r.t. Cut.
From a logical point of view, deduction modulo is not problematic, because proving in a rewrite system R is the same
as proving using some set of ﬁrst-order axioms, which is then called compatible (see [4, Proposition 1.8]). In particular, a
compatible axiom for the rewrite rule A → P is the proposition ∀x1, . . . , xn. A ⇔ P where x1, . . . , xn are the free variables of A.
To be able to do the samewith implications instead of equivalences, Dowek [15,12] introduced the polarized sequent calculus
modulo. In this, rewrite rules are distinguished by a (positive or negative) polarity written on the arrow of the rule. A polarity
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is also deﬁned for the positions of propositions: the root is positive, and we switch polarity under ¬ and at the left of ⇒. A
proposition is positively rewritten if it is rewritten by a positive rule at a positive position, or by a negative rule at a negative
position. A proposition is negatively rewritten if it is rewritten by a negative rule at a positive position, or by a positive rule
at a negative position. The polarized sequent calculus is similar to the asymmetric calculus modulo, but propositions on the
right of a sequent can only be positively rewritten, and propositions on the left only negatively. Term rewrite rules can be
indifferently applied to the left or the right. We will denote by PRR the set of all polarized rewrite rules.
If we try to do the same with the unfolding sequent calculus, we simply have to restrain ↑-l to negative rules, and ↑-r
to positive rules. We obtain that way what we call the polarized unfolding sequent calculus. The set of proof of the polarized
unfolding sequent calculus is denoted byPUSC. We show now that it is equivalent to the polarized sequent calculusmodulo.
First, we show that weakening and contraction are admissible in the polarized unfolding sequent calculus.
Lemma 2 (Weakening lemma). For all proposition rewrite system R, if there exist a proof of    in R, then for all propositions
P there exists proofs of , P   and   P, in R of the same size.
Proof. By induction on the proof, P can be propagated in the ﬁrst proof until Axioms, which accept side propositions. 
Lemma 3 (Kleene lemma [11, Lemma 3.3]). If a sequent, containing the non-atomic proposition P, has a proof (resp. Cut-free
proof) in R, then it has a proof (resp. Cut-free proof) in R whose ﬁrst rule is a logical rule with principal proposition P.
Proof. This is slightly more general than [11, Lemme 3.3], because we also consider ∀-l and ∃-r. But, for instance, if there is a
proof , ∀x. P  , by weakening there is a proof of the same size of , ∀x. P, {t/x}P  . The lemma can be proved by simple
induction on the size of the proof. 
Corollary 4. For all sequents   , the sequent  P(  ) has a Cut-free proof in R iff the sequent    has one.
Note. It should be remarked that all inference rules r but ∀-l and ∃-r (even ↑-l and ↑-r) can be permuted from above, in the
sense that if there is an application of r above some other inference rule r’ that do not decompose a principal proposition
into the principal proposition of r, then we can build a valid proof by permuting the inference rules, applying therefore r’
above r. This can also be proved by induction on the proof.
Lemma 5 (Contraction lemma). For all proposition rewrite system R, the two following statements hold:
• There exist a proof of , P   in R if and only if there exists a proof of , P, P   in R.
• There exist a proof of   P, in R if and only if there exists a proof of   P, P, in R.
Proof. One direction is a direct corollary of the Weakening Lemma.
The other one is a consequence of Kleene’s Lemma, and can be proved by lexicographic induction on the structure of the
proposition P and the size of the proof of , P, P  .
In the case of an atomic proposition A: suppose there exists a proof of , A, A  . If the principal proposition of the last
inference rule is not one of the A, then by we can just apply the induction hypothesis to the subproof. If the last inference
rule is Axiom, we can prune one of the A in it. The resulting proof has the same size. If the last inference rule is ↑-l for some
rewrite rule A →− P, then we have a strictly smaller proof of , A, A, P   to which we can apply the induction hypothesis
to get a proof of , A, P  . Apply ↑-l to this proof gives a proof of , A  .
In the case of∨: suppose there exists a proof of, P ∨ Q, P ∨ Q  . By Kleene’s Lemma there exist proofs of, P, P ∨ Q  
and, Q , P ∨ Q  .We can apply Kleene Lemma twice again to get proofs of, P, P  ;, Q , P  ;, P, Q   and, Q , Q 
. By induction hypothesis, we have proofs of , P   and , Q  , and therefore a proof of , P ∨ Q  .
In the case of ∃: suppose there exists a proof of , ∃x. Q, ∃x. Q  . By applying Kleene’s Lemma twice there exists a proof
of , {y/x}Q, {y′/x}Q   where y and y′ are not free in ,. Then, we can replace y′ by y in this proof to get a valid proof of
, {y/x}Q, {y/x}Q  . By induction hypothesis, there exists a proof of , {y/x}Q   where y is not free in  and . Therefore
we have a proof of , ∃x. Q  .
In the case of ∀: we proceed by induction on the proof of , ∀x. Q, ∀x. Q  . If no ∀x. Q is the principal proposition of the
last rule, this is a simple induction. If it is principal, the direct subproof proves , {t/x}Q, ∀x.Q, ∀x.Q   for some t ∈ T (, V).
By induction hypothesis, we have a proof of , {t/x}Q, ∀x. Q  , and therefore a proof of , ∀x. Q  . 
Note. The premises  and conclusions  of sequent    can therefore be considered as sets.
Lemma 6 (Rewrite lemma). For all proposition rewrite systems R1 and R2, the two following statements hold:
• If P ∗−→
R1∪RT (,V)
Q negatively and there exists a proof of , Q   in R2, then there exists a proof of , P   in R1 ∪ R2.
• If P ∗−→
R1∪RT (,V)
Q positively and there exists a proof of   Q, in R2, then there exists a proof of   P, in R1 ∪ R2.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of the rewrite derivation P
∗−→
R1∪RT (,V)
Q . We therefore only have to show it for
a single step of rewriting.
If P −→
R1∪RT (,V)
Q negatively, then there exists some context C[], an atomic proposition A and a proposition Q ′ such that
P = C[A] and Q = C[Q ′] and A −→
R1∪RT (,V)
Q ′ negatively if the position of the hole in the context is positive or positively in the
other case. We proceed by induction on the context. Suppose there exists a proof of , C[Q ′]  . We can transform it into
a proof of , C[A]   by applying the same inference rules, except when these rules are directly applied to Q ′, because it is
replaced by A. In this case, if the hole in C[] is at a positive position, then A is on the left of the sequent, and we can apply
↑-l (the rewrite rule that rewrites A into Q ′ is indeed negative in that case). In the other case, it is on the right and we can
apply ↑-r (the rewrite rule is indeed positive). We can then carry on the proof. The resulting proof uses then rewrite rules in
R1 ∪ R2 ∪ RT (,V), and is thus in R1 ∪ R2.
The second sentence is dual. 
Note that in all the previous lemmata, we do not introduce extra Cuts in the resulting proofs. This allows to prove the
equivalence with the polarized sequent calculus modulo, also w.r.t. Cut-free proofs.
Proposition 7 (Equivalence). The polarized unfolding sequent calculus is equivalent to the polarized sequent calculus modulo of
[15], that is, a sequent is provable (resp. provable without Cut) in the polarized unfolding sequent calculus in a proposition rewrite
system R iff it is provable (resp. provable without Cut) in the polarized sequent calculus modulo the rewrite system R ∪ RT (,V).
Proof. It is quite clear that the inference rules of the polarized unfolding sequent calculus can be derived in Dowek’s one,
by integrating each unfolding step into the inference rules above through the modulo.
Conversely, using Lemma 6, we can extract the rewriting from the logical rules. For instance, if we have a proof whose
root is
, Q     P,
, O   ⇒ -l O
∗−→ P ⇒ Q negatively
,
we use the premises to get a proof , P ⇒ Q  without implicit rewriting, andwe use Lemma 6 to get the proof of , O  .
Then, Lemmata 2 and 5 proves that weakening and contraction are admissible.
Of course, as we have seen, both system are also equivalent regarding Cut-free proofs, since we did not need to add any
Cut in the proofs of the previous lemmata. 
Corollary 8. The unfolding sequent calculus is equivalent (in the same sense) to the asymmetric sequent calculus modulo.
Proof. A non-polarized rewrite system R can easily be seen as a polarized rewrite system R± with for each rule A → P in
R a positive rule A →+ P and a negative rule A →− P. The unfolding sequent calculus for R (resp. the asymmetric sequent
calculus modulo for R) is then the polarized unfolding sequent calculus for R± (resp. the polarized sequent calculus modulo
for R±).
This translation also permits to know that every lemma above holds also for the unfolding sequent calculus. 
Given a polarized rewrite system R, we can transform it into a non-polarized rewrite system R∓:
• a positive rule A →+ P is translated into A → A ∨ P;
• a negative rule A →− P is translated into A → A ∧ P.
The polarized unfolding sequent calculus for R is then equivalent to the unfolding sequent calculus for R∓:
Proposition 9. A sequent is provable (resp. provable without Cut) in the polarized unfolding sequent calculus in a polarized
proposition rewrite systemR iff it is provable (resp.provablewithoutCut) in theunfolding sequent calculus in the rewrite systemR∓.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the proofs. Only the cases with unfolding rules are interesting.
If we have a proof ending with
, σA, σP  
, σA   ↑-l(A →
− P)
thenby inductionhypothesiswehave a proof of, σA, σP   in the unfolding sequent calculus. Using Lemma2, and applying
∧-lwe obtain a proof of , σA, σA ∧ σP  . We therefore can build the derivation
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, σA, σA, σP  
, σA, σ(A ∧ P)   ∧-l
, σA   ↑-l(A → A ∧ P)
in the unfolding sequent calculus. This is dual for the polarized ↑-r.
Conversely, there are two cases: either the rewrite rule is applied on the side corresponding to the polarity of the polarized
rule that produced it, or on the other side. In the ﬁrst case, suppose for instance that we have the proof
π....
  σ(A ∨ P), σA,
  σA, ↑-r(A → A ∨ P).
By induction hypothesis on π we have a proof of   σ(A ∨ P), σA, in the polarized unfolding sequent calculus. By Lemmata
3 and 5, we have a proof of   σP, σA,. Because σA −→
A→+P
σP positively, we can apply ↑-r to get a proof of   σA,. In the
second case, suppose for instance that we have the proof
π....
, σA, σ(A ∨ P)  
, σA   ↑-l(A → A ∨ P).
By inductionhypothesis onπ wehave aproof of, σA, σ(A ∨ P)   in thepolarizedunfolding sequent calculus. By Lemmata3
and 5, we have a proof of , σA  . 
Corollary 10. The polarized sequent calculus modulo and the asymmetric sequent calculus modulo are equivalent.
This somehow answers a question of Dowek [15, end of Section 4] who asked which polarized rewrite system can be
represented as a non-polarized rewrite system. We can also prove the equivalence for intuitionistic logic, with the same
translation. Tobeable todo this, oneneedsamulti-conclusionsequent calculus for intuitionistic logic, see [26] (the translation
is in the appendix of the full version of that paper, available at http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00395934). However, the non-polarized
system isnotnecessarily conﬂuent, and therefore,wemaynothave theequivalencewith theoriginal sequent calculusmodulo
of [4], at least concerningCut admissibility. Nevertheless, this should not be a problem. Indeed, the proving procedures based
ondeductionmodulo, TaMedandENAR, areactually complete for thecut-freepartof theasymmetric sequent calculusmodulo,
regardless of the conﬂuence of the rewrite system.
3. Undecidability of the cut admissibility
Wepresentheresomepropertiesof theunfoldingsequentcalculus,whichareslightgeneralizationsof [27,11]. Inparticular,
we introduce the notion of semantically sound rewrite systems, which implies Cut admissibility, and we prove that the Cut
admissibility is not decidable.
We need the following deﬁnitions, whose motivations can be found in [27]:
Deﬁnition 11 (Properties of a theory). Given a rewrite system R, a theory :
• is complete iff for all propositions P, either , P  or   P has a Cut-free proof in R;
• is consistent iff there is no Cut-free proof of   in R;
• admits Henkin witnesses iff for all propositions Q with one free variable x, there is a constant c of the language such that
− if , ∃x. Q  has no Cut-free proof in R, then {c/x}Q is in ;
− if   ∀x. Q has no Cut-free proof in R, then ¬{c/x}Q is in .
Models in deduction modulo are standard ﬁrst-order models, except that they are compatible with the rewrite system:
Deﬁnition 12 (Model for a rewrite system). A BooleanmodelM is amodel for the rewrite system R if for all rewrite rules A → P
in R, A and P are interpreted the same way in M.
We introduce the new notion of semantically sound rewrite system:
Deﬁnition 13 (Semantical soundness). A rewrite system R is said semantically sound if every complete, consistent theory 
which admits Henkin witnesses has a model M for R.
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Proposition 14 (Semantical soundness implies Cut admissibility). If R is semantically sound, then R admits Cut.
Proof. As proved by Hermant [27, Lemma 3], if    has a proof in R, then any modelM for R interprets P(  ) as true.
It remains to be proved that if any model M for R interprets P(  ) as true then    has a Cut-free proof in R.
If ¬P(  ) is consistent, then using [27, Section 6.1], we can complete it into a consistent, complete theory  which
admits Henkin witnesses. By hypothesis (semantical soundness),  has a model M for R. Furthermore, by construction of
 this model is also a model for ¬P(  ). Consequently, this model for R does not interpret P(  ) as true, which
contradicts our hypothesis.
Hence ¬P(  ) is not consistent, by deﬁnition there is a Cut-free proof of ¬P(  )  in R, and using Lemma 3 there
is a Cut-free proof of   . 
This proposition permits to prove the main theorem of this ﬁrst section:
Theorem 15 (Undecidability of the Cut admissibility). The problem
Input: A propositional rewrite system R
Decide if R admits Cut.
is undecidable.
Proof. We reduce to the validity problem in ﬁrst-order logic (given a proposition, decide whether it is valid in all ﬁrst-order
models). We recall the reader that this problem is undecidable in the empty theory when the language contains at least a
binary predicate.
Let P be a ﬁrst-order proposition.
Let A be a nullary predicate not appearing in P. Consider the propositional rewrite system
R = {A → A ⇒ P }.
It is always possible to build a proof of  P in R:
A, P  P Axiom A  A, P Axiom
A, A ⇒ P  P ⇒ -l
A  P ↑-l
A  P, A, P Axiom
 A ⇒ P, A, P ⇒ -r
 A, P ↑-r
 P Cut(A)
Then we show that P is valid if and only if R admits Cut:
If P is valid, then R is semantically sound: given a complete, consistent theory  which admits Henkin witnesses, let M
be the model deﬁned as follows: Its domain is the set of closed terms. An atomic predicate B is interpreted as true by M
iff   B has a Cut-free proof in R. Because the theory is complete and because it admits Henkin witnesses, this permits to
deﬁne themodel for all propositions (see [27], Lemma 8). This process is well-deﬁned by consistency. Then A has aCut-free
proof (the right part of the proof above where P is pruned). By weakening   A has a Cut-free proof in R, and A is therefore
interpreted as true byM. As P is valid, it is interpreted as true in particular inM. Consequently, the interpretation of A ⇒ P
is also true. Thus, the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the rules in R have the same interpretation in M, which is
therefore a model for R. Consequently, R is semantically sound and by Proposition 14 it admits Cut.
Conversely, if R admits Cut, because of the existence of the proof above, there exists a Cut-free proof of  P in R. Because
P does not contain A, no unfolding rules can be applied in this proof (simple proof by induction). Therefore, there exists a
proof of  P in Gentzen’s sequent calculus, and as it is complete for ﬁrst-order logic, P is valid. 
Note. This proof is deeply inspired by the proof in [11, Chapter 8] that there exists terminating and conﬂuent rewrite systems
that admits Cut, but in which some proof is not normalizing. Cut admissibility remains undecidable even when considering
only terminating and conﬂuent rewrite system, by using the system r ∈ r → ∀y. (∀x. y ∈ x ⇒ r ∈ x) ⇒ y ∈ r ⇒ P in the proof
above.
Note. In fact, this problem seems to be 0
2
-complete in the arithmetical hierarchy (see [28, Chapter C.1] for an introduction
on the arithmetical hierarchy), i.e. it is not even semi-decidable. This could be proved by merging the proof above with
techniques used in [29] to prove in particular that the conﬂuence of a rewrite system is 0
2
-complete.
4. Construction of a rewrite system compatible with a theory
We now present an algorithm transforming a ﬁnitely presented ﬁrst-order theory into a polarized rewrite system such
that, proving in the theory is equivalent to proving modulo the rewrite system.We ﬁrst deﬁne the good properties that such
an algorithm should have, and then provide an example of such an algorithm.
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4.1. Desired properties
We want to build an algorithm that translates a ﬁnite presentation of a ﬁrst-order theory into a rewrite system. This
algorithm may be seen as a function from sequents to polarized rewrite systems: Rew : S → PRR.
First, we require that each polarized rewrite rule can be produced by the algorithm. This is not really useful here, but we
need this for the completion procedure in the next section.
Property 16. For all polarized rewrite rule r there exists a sequent s such that Rew(s) = {r}.
Then we want that the theory is compatible with the rewrite system produced from it. Moreover, we would like that at
least the axioms in the presentation of the theory are provable without Cut in the produced rewrite system.
Property 17 (Strong compatibility). For all sequents   , Rew(  ) and P(  ) are strongly compatible:
(a) for all positive rewrite rule A →+ P in Rew(  ), there exists a proof ofP(  )  P ⇒ A in ∅ (i.e. using only term rewrite
rules of RT (,V));
(b) for all negative rewrite rule A →− P in Rew(  ), there exists a proof ofP(  )  A ⇒ P in ∅ (i.e. using only term rewrite
rules of RT (,V));
(c) there exists a Cut-free proof of  P(  ) in Rew(  ).
Property 17 is a stronger notion than the compatibility in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.4 of [4]: it imposes Cut-free proof in
(c) and it does not care about term rewrite rules. Property 17(a) and (b) implies the following:
Proposition 18. For all sequents   , for all rewrite systems R, if there is a proof of a sequent ′  ′ in the rewrite system
Rew(  ) ∪ R, there is a proof of P(  ),′  ′ in R.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the proof of ′  ′. The only interesting case is when the last inference rule is an
unfolding rule. If it is ↑-l with a rule in Rew(  ) \ R, we have
....
′, A, P  ′
′, A  ′ ↑-l(B →
− Q )
with B →− Q in Rew(  ) and A = σB, P = σQ for some substitution σ . By induction hypothesis, there exists a proof π of
P(  ),′, A, P  ′ in ∅. By Property 17(b), there is a proof 	 of P(  )  B ⇒ Q in ∅. We can apply σ to 	 to get a valid
proof 	 ′ of P(  )  A ⇒ P.
We can therefore build the proof
π....
P(  ),′, A, P  ′ P(  ),′, A  A,′ Axiom
P(  ),′, A, A ⇒ P  ′ ⇒ -l 	 ′
P(  ),′, A  ′ Cut(A ⇒ P)
which is indeed in R.
The case of ↑-r is very similar. 
The next property will also be useful for the completion procedure. It essentially says that Rew should be modular, i.e. for
all sequents s, s1, s2, if Rew(s) = Rew(s1) ∪ Rew(s2) then having a cut-free proof of s1 and s2 implies having a cut-free proof of
s, whatever the rewrite system used in the modulo.
Property 19. For all proposition rewrite system R, for all sequents s, if for all rewrite rules r ∈ Rew(s) there exists a sequent sr
which is provable without Cut in R and such that r ∈ Rew(sr), then s has a Cut-free proof in R.
4.2. An algorithm . . .
Wenowpresent onepossible algorithmhaving the requiredproperties. It is quite simple todescribe: it consists in applying
rules of the sequent calculus to the sequent until an atomic proposition appears in the sequent. This atomic proposition will
be the left-hand side of the polarized rewrite rule, the polarity of the rule will depend on the side of the sequent in which A
appears, and the right-hand side will contain all other propositions.
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Moreprecisely, the algorithmcanbedescribedby thenon-deterministic steps below. Todecomposeuniversally quantiﬁed
propositions on the left and existentially quantiﬁed propositions on the right only once, we mark that they have already
been decomposed by underlining them.
Step 1. Choose a sequent. Push all negated propositions on the other side of the sequent. For instance, A,¬B  ¬C,¬¬D
becomes A, C  B, D. If the new  contains only underlined propositions (or no proposition), go to Step 2. If the new
 contains only underlined propositions (or no proposition), go to Step 3. Else, go to either Step 2 or 3.
Step 2. Decompose the last proposition iteratively:
P1, . . . , Pn  Q1, . . . , Qm becomes P1, . . . , Pn,¬Q1, . . . ,¬Qm−1  Qm
P1, . . . , Pn  Q1 ∧ Q2 ” P1, . . . , Pn  Q1 ; P1, . . . , Pn  Q2
P1, . . . , Pn  Q1 ∨ Q2 ” P1, . . . , Pn,¬Q1  Q2
P1, . . . , Pn  Q1 ⇒ Q2 ” P1, . . . , Pn, Q1  Q2
P1, . . . , Pn  ∀x. Q ” P1, . . . , Pn  {y/x}Q
where y does not appear in P1, . . . , Pn
P1, . . . , Pn  ∃x. Q ” P1, . . . , Pn,¬∃x. Q  {t/x}Q
where t can be any term
P1, . . . , Pn  A ” A →+ ∃x1, . . . , xp. (P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pn)
(A atomic, and the xi are the free variables appearing in P1, . . . , Pn but not in A)
for P1, . . . , Pn  ¬Q , return to Step 1
Step 3. Decompose the ﬁrst proposition iteratively, dually from Step 2. For instance,
P1 ⇒ P2  Q1, . . . , Qm becomes P2  Q1, . . . , Qm ; ¬P1  Q1, . . . , Qm
∀x. P  Q1, . . . , Qm ” {t/x}P  ¬∀x. P, Q1, . . . , Qm
where t can be any term
A  Q1, . . . , Qm ” A →− ∀x1, . . . , xp. (Q1 ∨ · · · ∨ Qm)
(A atomic, and the xi are the free variables appearing in Q1, . . . , Qm but not in A)
for ¬P  Q1, . . . , Qm, return to Step 1.
In practice, we can for instance choose x for t, so that no substitution is needed in those cases. All other choices are also
correct. Of course, at the end, the underlines are removed.
This algorithmclearly terminates, becauseeach timesaStep2or3begins, eithera rewrite rule isgenerated, oraproposition
is decomposed into subformulae, so that the number of connectors in the non-underlined propositions in a sequent different
from ¬ strictly diminishes. Of course, we do not pretend that this algorithm is the most optimized for our purpose.
We denote Rew(  ) the function returning the rewrite system obtained by applying the algorithm to {  }.
To get an intuition on this algorithm, it may be seen as the attempt to build a Cut-free proof of a sequent, adding rewrite
rules to close the branches where an atomic proposition appears.
4.3. . . . with the good properties
We ﬁrst prove Property 17 using three lemmata.
Lemma 20. If the sequent    is transformed to the set of sequents {′  ′} ∪ S′ by the algorithm described in Section 4.2,
then the sequent
P(  )  P(′  ′)
can be proved (without proposition rewrite rules).
Proof. By case analysis on the transformation. For instance, in Step 2, P1, . . . , Pn  Q1 ∧ Q2 is transformed into P1, . . . , Pn 
Q1; P1, . . . , Pn  Q2. Suppose x1, . . . , xn (resp. y1, . . . , ym) are the free variables of P1, . . . , Pn, Q1 ∧ Q2 (resp. P1, . . . , Pn, Q1).
{y1, . . . , ym} ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn} so that we can suppose yi = xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. We have the following proof (only relevant propo-
sitions are written, and the substitutions are forgotten in the above part of the proof):
Q1, Q2  Q1 Axiom
Q1 ∧ Q2  Q1 ∧-l
∧
i Pi 
∧
i Pi
Axiom∧
i Pi ⇒ (Q1 ∧ Q2),
∧
i Pi  Q1 ⇒ -l∧
i Pi ⇒ (Q1 ∧ Q2) 
∧
i Pi ⇒ Q1
⇒ -r
∀x1, . . . , xn. (
∧
i Pi ⇒ (Q1 ∧ Q2))  (
∧
i Pi ⇒ Q1) ∀-l
∀x1, . . . , xn. (
∧
i Pi ⇒ (Q1 ∧ Q2))  ∀y1, . . . , ym. (
∧
i Pi ⇒ Q1)
∀-r
It can be checked that the side conditions of the rules ∃-l and ∀-r are veriﬁed. 
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Lemma 21. For all propositions A, P1, . . . , Pn, if x1, . . . , xp are the free variables of P1, . . . , Pn not appearing freely in A, then the
sequents
P(P1, . . . , Pn  A)  (∃x1, . . . , xp.
∧
i
Pi) ⇒ A
P(A  P1, . . . , Pn)  A ⇒ ∀x1, . . . , xp.
∨
i
Pi
can be proved (without proposition rewrite rules).
Proof. Suppose y1, . . . , ym are the free variables of A, P1, . . . , Pn. Note that {x1, . . . , xp} ⊆ {y1, . . . , ym} so that we can suppose
yi = xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. We can construct the following proof (only relevant propositions are written):
A  A Axiom ∧i Pi ∧i Pi Axiom
(
∧
i Pi ⇒ A),
∧
i Pi  A
⇒ -l
∀y1, . . . , ym. (
∧
i Pi ⇒ A),
∧
i Pi  A
∀-l
∀y1, . . . , ym. (
∧
i Pi ⇒ A), ∃x1, . . . , xp.
∧
i Pi  A
∃-l
∀y1, . . . , ym. (
∧
i Pi ⇒ A)  (∃x1, . . . , xp.
∧
i Pi) ⇒ A
⇒ -r
The proof of the other sequent is dual. 
Note that although the proofs given by Lemmata 20 and 21 areCut-free, wewill needCuts to link them and prove Property
17(a) and (b).
Lemma 22. For all atomic propositions A and propositions P1, . . . , Pn, if x1, . . . , xp are the free variables of P1, . . . , Pn not appearing
freely in A, then we can prove without Cut the sequent
 P(P1, . . . , Pn  A)
in the rewrite system consisting of the rule A →+ ∃x1, . . . , xp. (P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pn), and the sequent
 P(A  P1, . . . , Pn)
in the rewrite system consisting of the rule A →− ∀x1, . . . , xp. (P1 ∨ · · · ∨ Pn).
Proof. Suppose y1, . . . , ym are the free variables of A, P1, . . . , Pn. Note that {x1, . . . , xp} ⊆ {y1, . . . , ym} so that we can suppose
yi = xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Because x1, . . . , xp do not appear in A, {ti/yi}A = {ti/yi : i > p}A. Only relevant propositions arewritten:
P1  P1 Axiom · · · Pn  Pn Axiom
P1, . . . , Pn  A, P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pn ∧-r∧
i Pi  A, P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pn
∧-l∧
i Pi  A, ∃x1, . . . , xp. (P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pn)
∃-r∧
i Pi  A
↑-r
∧i Pi ⇒ A ⇒ -r
 ∀y1, . . . , ym. (
∧
i Pi ⇒ A)
∀-r 
We can prove Property 19 using the following lemma:
Lemma 23. For all proposition rewrite system R, if the set of sequents S is transformed into the set of sequents S′ by the algorithm
of Section 4.2 without the production of a rewrite rule, then all sequents of S have a (resp. Cut-free) proof in R iff all sequents of S′
have a (resp. Cut-free) proof in R.
Proof. By case analysis on the transformation. The “if” part is the application of logical rules, whereas the “only if” part is a
consequence of Lemma 3.
For instance, P1, . . . , Pn  ∀x. Q is transformed into P1, . . . , Pn  {y/x}Q where y does not appear in P1, . . . , Pn. If P1, . . . , Pn 
{y/x}Q has a proof in R, then because y does not appear in P1, . . . , Pn, P1, . . . , Pn  ∀x. Q has a proof in R by application of ∀-r.
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Conversely, if P1, . . . , Pn  ∀x. Q has a proof in R, then by Lemma 3 there exists a proof of P1, . . . , Pn  {y/x}Q in R for y not free
in P1, . . . , Pn. Therefore P1, . . . , Pn  {y/x}Q has a proof in R.
In the preceding paragraph, if proofs are supposed Cut-free, then the resulting proofs have the same property. 
We can now prove the main result of this subsection:
Proposition 24. The Rew function deﬁned in Section 4.2 has the Properties 16, 17 and 19.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the execution of the algorithm of Section 4.2.
Property 16 directly follows from the fact that Rew(A  P) = {A →− P} and Rew(P  A) = {A →+ P}.
For Property 17(a) and (b), Lemma 21 permits to prove the properties at the end of the algorithm, when sequents are
transformed into rules. Lemma 20 permits to prove the inductive case: suppose    is transformed into {′  ′} ∪ · · · .
Suppose P(′  ′)  A ⇒ P has a proof π without proposition rewrite rules. By Lemma 20, there is a proof π ′ of P(  ) 
P(′  ′) in ∅. Therefore, we can construct the proof
π....
P(  ),P(′  ′)  A ⇒ P
π ′....
P(  )  P(′  ′), A ⇒ P
P(  )  A ⇒ P Cut(P(
′  ′))
without proposition rewrite rules.
For Property 17(c), the base case is a consequence of Lemma 22, whereas the inductive case is a consequence of Lemma
3. For instance, suppose P1, . . . , Pn  Q1 ∧ Q2 is transformed into P1, . . . , Pn  Q1; P1, . . . , Pn  Q2. For i ∈ {1,2}, suppose 
P(P1, . . . , Pn  Qi) has a Cut-free proof in some rewrite system Ri. By Lemma 3, there is a Cut-free proof πi of P1, . . . , Pn  Qi
in Ri. Consequently we can construct the Cut-free proof
π1....
P1, . . . , Pn  Q1
π2....
P1, . . . , Pn  Q2
 P(P1, . . . , Pn  Q1 ∧ Q2) ∀-r,⇒-r,∧-l,∧-r
in R1 ∪ R2.
For Property 19, using Lemma 23 by induction on the execution of the algorithm, we obtain that a sequent s is provable
without Cut in a rewrite system R iff the sequents eventually producing all rules of Rew(s) are provable without Cut in R.
Suppose that for all r ∈ Rew(s) there exists a sequent sr provable without Cut in R such that r ∈ Rew(s′). Then the sequent
producing each r can be proved without Cut in R. Therefore s can be proved without Cut in R. 
Note. P(  ) is compatible with Rew(  ) in classical logic, but it is not true for intuitionistic logic. For instance,
Rew( ∃x. B(x)) = {B(x) →+ ¬∃x. B(x)}. Then,  ∃x. B(x) has the following proof in Rew( ∃x, B(x))
∃x. B(x)  ∃x. B(x), B(x) Axiom
 ∃x. B(x), B(x),¬∃x. B(x) ¬-r
 ∃x. B(x), B(x) ↑-r
 ∃x. B(x) ∃-r
in the classical polarized unfolding sequent calculus but it has no proof in, for instance, the polarized natural deduction of
[15], which is an intuitionistic system. As pointed out by a referee, it is not possible to transform an axiom ∃x. B(x) into a
rewrite system admitting Cut and compatible in intuitionistic logic, because the theory formed with the axiom do not enjoy
the witness property, but it would using the rewrite system. Notice also that, as shown by Hermant [11], Cut admissibility in
classical and intuitionistic logic are not equivalent in deduction modulo.
Note. It is possible that the produced rewrite systemdoes not admitCut. For instance, on A ⇔ B ∧ ¬A the algorithm returns
Crabbé’s system of the introduction.
As a nice consequence of the properties of Rew, we obtain a way to internalize in the congruence any ﬁrst-order theory:
Corollary 25. For all ﬁnite set of formulae  and rewrite systems R, there exists a rewrite system R′ such that for all ﬁnite set of
formulae  :    is derivable in R iff   is derivable in R′.
Proof. Simply take R′ = R ∪⋃P∈ Rew( P). 
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5. Abstract completion for cut admissibility
We present in this section the completion procedure which permits to transform a rewrite system into one admitting
Cut. It is based on an abstract completion procedure introduced in the framework of the abstract canonical systems and
inference, that we are ﬁrst presenting.
5.1. Abstract canonical systems and inference
The results in this section are extracted from [30,16] and [17], which should be consulted for motivations, details and
proofs. We deﬁne a framework with abstract notions of formulae, proofs, etc. These should not be confused with the ﬁrst-
order propositions and sequent-calculus proofs used before, although the framework could be instantiated with those. In
Section 5.2 we will see which exact instance we will be using. In this section, to give intuitions, we will use standard
completion as an example of instance, but without going into details (that can be found in [19]).
Let A be the set of all (abstract) formulae over some ﬁxed vocabulary. Let P be the set of all (abstract) proofs. These
sets are linked by two functions: [·]Pm : P → 2A gives the premises in a proof, and [·]Cl : P → A gives its conclusion. Both are
extended to sets of proofs in the usual fashion. The set of proofs built using assumptions in R ⊆ A is denoted by
Pf (R)
!=
{
p ∈ P : [p]Pm ⊆ R
}
.
The framework described here is predicated on two well-founded partial orderings over P: a proof ordering > and a subproof
relation . They are related by a monotonicity requirement (postulate E). The proof ordering expresses the quality of proofs,
whereas the subproof relation translates their structures. We assume for convenience that the proof ordering only compares
proofs with the same conclusion (p > q ⇒ [p]Cl = [q]Cl), rather than mention this condition each time we have cause to
compare proofs.
Example 26. For standard completion, formulae are rewrite rules or equations, proofs are proofs by rewriting (for instance
a←−
s→t b−→u→v c←→e=f d as a proof of a = d in Pf ({s → t;u → v; e = f })). The proof ordering is chosen so that a←−s→t b−→u→v c is greater
than a←→
a=c c, which is greater than a proof of the form a
∗−→ ∗←− c.
We will use the term presentation to mean a set of formulae, and justiﬁcation to mean a set of proofs. We reserve the term
theory for deductively closed presentations:
ThR
!= [Pf (R)]Cl = {[p]Cl : p ∈ P, [p]Pm ⊆ R}.
In addition to this, we assume the two following postulates:
Postulate A (Reﬂexivity). For all presentations R:
R ⊆ ThR.
Postulate B (Closure). For all presentations R:
Th ThR ⊆ ThR.
Wecall a proof trivialwhen it proves only its unique assumption andhasno subproofs other than itself, that is, if [p]Pm = {[p]Cl}
and pq ⇒ p = q, where is the reﬂexive closure of the subproof ordering. We denote by â such a trivial proof of a ∈ A
and by R̂ the set of trivial proofs of each a ∈ R.
Example 27. For standard completion, the trivial proof of s → t is just s−→
s→t t.
We assume that proofs use their assumptions (postulate C), that subproofs do not use non-existent assumptions (postulate
D), and that proof orderings are monotonic with respect to subproofs (postulate E):
Postulate C (Trivia). For all proofs p and formulae a:
a ∈ [p]Pm ⇒ pâ.
Postulate D (Subproofs Premises Monotonicity). For all proofs p and q:
pq ⇒ [p]Pm ⊇ [q]Pm.
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Postulate E (Replacement). For all proofs p, q and r:
pq > r ⇒ ∃v ∈ Pf ([p]Pm ∪ [r]Pm). p > v r.
We make no other assumptions regarding proofs or their structure and the proof ordering > is lifted to a quasi-ordering
over presentations:
R1R2 if ThR1 = ThR2 and ∀p ∈ Pf (R1). ∃q ∈ Pf (R2). p ≥ q.
A normal-form proof for Rwill be a proof that is minimal whatever the presentation of the theory build on R, i.e. it is one
of the minimal proofs of Pf (ThR):
Nf (R)
!= μPf (ThR)
!= {p ∈ Pf (ThR) : ¬∃q ∈ Pf (ThR). p > q}
.
Normal-form proofs are the best, the one we wish we can build from our current presentation.
Example 28. For standard completion, normal proofs are valley proofs, that is, proofs of the form a
∗−→ ∗←− c.
The canonical presentation contains those formulae that appear as assumptions of normal-form proofs:
R

!= [Nf (R)]Pm .
So,wewill say thatR is canonical ifR = R
. Intuitively, the canonical presentation ofR contains the formulae that are necessary
to build all the best proofs of the theory of R, and only these formulae.
A presentation R is complete if every theorem has a normal-form proof:
ThR = [Pf (R) ∩ Nf (R)]Cl.
Canonicity implies completeness, but the converse is not true. Intuitively, R is complete iff it contains enough to build all the
theory using only its own best proofs.
Example 29. For standard completion, completeness means that every equality provable with a rewrite system can be
proved with this rewrite system using a valley proof. In other words, a complete rewrite system is conﬂuent.
We now consider inference and deduction mechanisms. A deduction mechanism  is a function from presentations to
presentations and we call the relation R1  R2 a deduction step.
A sequence of presentations R0  R1  · · · is called a derivation.
The result of the derivation is, as usual, its persisting formulae:
R∞
!= lim inf
j→∞
Rj =
⋃
j>0
⋂
i>j
Ri.
A deduction mechanism is completing if for each step R1  R2, R1R2 and the limit R∞ is complete.
A completing mechanism can be used to build normal-form proofs of theorems of the initial presentation:
Theorem 30 ([17], Lemma 5.13]). A deduction mechanism is completing if and only if for all derivations R0  R1  · · · ,
Th R0 ⊆ [Pf (R∞) ∩ Nf (R0)]Cl.
A critical proof is a minimal proof which is not in normal form, but whose strict subproofs are:
Crit(R)
!=
{
p ∈ μPf (R)\Nf (R) :
∀q ∈ Pf (R). p q ⇒ q ∈ Nf (R)
}
.
Intuitively, a critical proof of R is a minimal (in terms of quality and structure) counter-example that shows that R is not
complete.
Example 31. For standard completion, critical proofs correspond to non-conﬂuent critical pairs, that is, proofs
a ←−
s[b]→a
s[b]−→
b→c
s[c] with no valley proof a ∗−→ ∗←− s[c]. Standard completion adds the equation a = s[c] to the presentation,
so that it is possible to build the smaller proof a ←→
a=s[c] s[c].
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The idea to obtain a complete presentation is therefore to enhance the current presentation with formulae that permits to
build proofs smaller than the critical ones. Completing formulae are then premises of proofs smaller than critical proofs:
Comp(R)
!=
⋃
p ∈ Crit(R)
p′ is any proof such that p > p′
[p′]Pm.
To get a completing procedure, we therefore need to add at least these proofs, and we can only add formulae that are in
the theory. In this paper, given some function C from presentations to presentations such that Comp(R) ⊆ C(R) ⊆ ThR for all
presentations R, the deduction mechanism is therefore:
R R ∪ C(R).
Proposition 32 ([30, Lemma 10]). This deduction mechanism is completing.
Example 33. For standard completion, the deduction mechanism is more evolved, because there are also simpliﬁcation
steps. Burel and Kirchner [19] give remaining details.
5.2. Deduction modulo is an instance of ACS
We want to show that the polarized unfolding sequent calculus can be seen as an instance of ACS. For this purpose, we
have to deﬁne what the (abstract) formulae, proofs, premises and conclusions are, and to give the appropriate orderings.
After this, we need to check that the postulates are veriﬁed by the deﬁned instance.
5.2.1. Proofs and formulae
We aim to obtain Cut-free proofs, so that the natural candidate for abstract proofs are polarized-unfolding-sequent-
calculus proofs.
The completion procedurewewant to establish dealswith polarized rewrite rules over atomic propositions. Nevertheless,
the conclusions of the proofs, from which we want to generate the rewrite rules added by the completion mechanism, are
sequents. In other words, sequents must be related to rewrite rules. We therefore assume that we have a function Rew
satisfying Properties 16, 17 and 19. Only these properties are important, so thatwe do not need to use the particular algorithm
given in Section 4.2.
Then, ACS formulae will be polarized rewrite rules (similarly as for standard completion), and proofs will be polarized-
unfolding-sequent-calculus proofs. The premises of a proof are the rewrite rules used in that proof. For the conclusion, as a
sequent may be associated by Rew to several rewrite rules, wewould need proofs with several conclusions. However, we can
bypass this by considering several instances of a proof of   , one for each rules in Rew(  ). The conclusion of a proof
will therefore be this particular rule.
5.2.2. Orderings on proofs
To deﬁne an ordering on proofs, we need the concept of proof skeleton:
Deﬁnition 34. The skeleton of a proof p is the tree labeled by the inference rules used p, with the active proposition in the
case of Cut and Axiom.
We deﬁne the following precedence > on inference rules: for all propositions P, Q , O, if P is greater than Q for the
subformula relation, then Cut(P) > Cut(Q ) and Axiom(P) > Axiom(Q ), and for all other inference rules r of Fig. 1, Cut(P) >
Axiom(O) > r. This precedence is inﬁnite, but it is well-founded because the subformula relation is.
We order the proof skeletons with the RPO [31] based on this precedence. Since the precedence is well-founded, so is
the RPO [31]. We deﬁne the ordering over proofs by saying that a proof is strictly greater than another if this holds for their
skeletons. This deﬁnes therefore a well-founded ordering on proofs.
We restrict this ordering to proofs which have the same conclusion.
Notice that with this ordering, a Cut-free proof is always strictly smaller than a proof with at least one Cut at root.
Note. To get a completion procedure producing rewrite systems admitting Cut, it should have been possible to use a coarser
ordering, the essential property being that proofs with Cut are bigger than proofs without. Nevertheless, the ﬁner the
ordering is, the fewer the critical proofs are. To be able to better characterize the critical proofs, the ordering we are using
seems convenient. Moreover, we use an RPO because it is a simpliﬁcation ordering and Postulate E is therefore easier to
prove.
Subproofs of a proof p are for a part deﬁned as the subproofs of p for the sequent calculus. We also want to say that
if a proof do not use a proposition (i.e. it is the weakened version of another proof), then the strengthened proof should
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be smaller for the subproof relation. We therefore consider the transitive closure of the subproof ordering in the unfolding
sequent calculus and this “weakening” ordering.
Deﬁnition 35. We say that πspπ ′ iff π ′ is a strict subproof of π in the sequent calculus.
We say that πwπ ′ if there is a proposition in π that can be pruned from all sequents in π to produce the valid proof π ′.
PUSC will be the transitive closure ofsp ∪w .
Lemma 36. If π1PUSCπ2 then there exists π3 such that π1∗spπ3∗wπ2.
Proof. Weonly need to show that if π1wπ2spπ3 then there exist some π ′2 such that π1spπ ′2wπ3. If π1wπ2 there exists
some proposition P that can be pruned in the sequents in π1 to get π2. Let π
′
2
be π3 in which P is added in each sequents by
weakening in the same side as in π1. Then π
′
2
is a subproof of π1. 
Unfortunately, this deﬁnition is not sufﬁcient to deﬁne trivial proofs, because if we use a premise through a ↑-l or ↑-r rule,
there will always be a strict subproof, so that there are no proofs using premises without strict subproofs. For instance,
P  P Axiom
A  P ↑-l
seems a good candidate for the trivial proof A →− P̂ , but is contains the subproof P  P Axiom.
To solve this problem, we can manually add the trivial proofs. We therefore consider proofs â for each formula a ∈ A.
We have to extend the ordering > to trivial proofs: it can be simply done by saying that they cannot be compared with
other proofs.
For Postulate C to be veriﬁed, we have to extend the subproof relation:
pq if – q is a subproof of p forPUSC
– or q = âwith a ∈ [p]Pm.
This relation iswell-founded because of thewellfoundedness of the subproof relation in the sequent calculus, and because
trivial proofs cannot have strict subproofs.
To summarize, with respect to the deﬁnitions of ACSs (see Section 5.1) deduction modulo can be seen as an ACS, in the
following way:
• A: formulae are polarized rewrite rules
A
!= PRR (=Rew(S) by Property 16).
• P: proofs are either couples formed with a sequent-calculus proof and a polarized rule in the rewrite system associated
with its conclusion, or trivial proofs:
P
!=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
〈 .
.
.
   , A →
± P
〉
∈ PUSC × A : (A →± P) ∈ Rew(  )
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ .
∪ {̂a : a ∈ A}
• [·]Pm: premises of a non-trivial proof are the rewrite rules used in its ﬁrst component, the unique premise of a trivial proof
is the formula it corresponds to.
• [·]Cl: the conclusion of a non-trivial proof is its second component, the conclusion of a trivial proof is the formula it
corresponds to.
• >: the ordering on proofs is deﬁned by p > q if p and q are not trivial, their second component is the same as well as the
conclusion of their ﬁrst component, and the skeleton of the ﬁrst component of p is greater than the one of q for the RPO
based on the precedence deﬁned by: for all propositions P, Q , O, if P is greater than Q for the subformula relation, then
Cut(P) > Cut(Q ) and Axiom(P) > Axiom(Q ), and for all other inference rules r of Fig. 1, Cut(P) > Axiom(O) > r.
•: the subproof ordering is deﬁned by pq if
− neither p nor q are trivial and the ﬁrst component of p is greater than the ﬁrst component of q forPUSC;
− or q = âwith a ∈ [p]Pm.
With these deﬁnitions we can prove the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 37 (Instance of ACS). The unfolding sequent calculus is an instance of ACS, with the deﬁnitions of A, P, [·]Pm, [·]Cl, >
and given above.
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Proof. First we need to show that > and  are strict and well-founded orderings. It is not too difﬁcult to prove that > is
irreﬂexive and transitive. It is well-founded because the RPO on skeleton is, because the subformula relation is. Concerning
, ﬁrst remark that âq iff q = â. Then, we only need to show thatPUSC is a strict ordering: indeed, it is trivially irreﬂexive,
and transitive by deﬁnition. To show that  is well-founded we also only need to show that PUSC is. This is less trivial,
but can be shown using Lemma 36 which says that if pPUSCq, then q can be obtained by pruning some propositions in a
subproof of p. Then we only need to show thatsp andw are well-founded, which holds because the ﬁrst relation makes
the skeleton of proof decrease whereas the second makes the number of propositions in the conclusion decrease.
We then show the postulates:
• Postulate A: suppose a ∈ R, we want to show that a is the conclusion of a proof built with R. â is such a proof.
• Postulate B: let a be in Th ThR. By deﬁnition there is a proof p ∈ Pf (ThR) such that [p]Cl = a. If p is trivial, then {a} = [p]Pm ⊆
ThR therefore a ∈ ThR. If p is not trivial, then its ﬁrst component πp ∈ PUSC proves   in ThR for some   such that
a ∈ Rew(  ). Rewrite rules used in πp are therefore in ThR. Let b ∈ [p]Pm be such a rule. There exists q ∈ Pf (R) such that
[q]Cl = b. If q is trivial, then {b} = [p]Pm ⊆ R therefore b = [p]Cl ∈ R. Else, its ﬁrst component πq ∈ PUSC proves s in R for
some s such that b ∈ Rew(s). Using Property 17 and Proposition 18, we can transform πp into a proof 	p of ,Prop(s)  
in [p]Pm \ Rew(s). One can apply ∧-l, ∨-r, ⇒-r and ∀-r to πq to get a proof of  Prop(s) in R. By applying Cut to this proof
and 	p we obtain a proof of    in [p]Pm \ Rew(s) ∪ R. By repeating this process to every premises of p not in R, we
eventually obtain a proof π in Rwhose conclusion is   . Then, a = [〈π , a〉]Cl ∈ [Pf (R)]Cl = ThR.
• Postulate C: it holds by deﬁnition of the subproof relation.
• Postulate D: suppose pq. If q = â then by deﬁnition of, we have [q]Pm = {a} ⊆ [p]Pm. If q is not trivial, neither is p. In
that case, by deﬁnition ofPUSC the ﬁrst component of q use a subset of the rules used in the ﬁrst component of p.
• Postulate E: suppose pq > r. Because q is comparable with r, none of them is trivial, and p neither. We call πp, πq and πr
their ﬁrst components. Because of Lemma 36, πq can be obtained by pruning some ﬁrst-order propositions in a subproof
π ′ of πp. By deﬁnition of>, πq and πr have the same conclusion.We can therefore add the propositions pruned in π ′ in πr ,
and replace π ′ by this proof in πp to get a valid proof πv. If a is the second component of p, then let v
!= 〈πv, a〉, which is
a correct ACS proof because πp and πv have the same conclusion. Then p > v because the RPO is a simpliﬁcation ordering
and because if π1wπ2, then π1 and π2 have the same skeleton. Moreover, by deﬁnition of πv, vr. Furthermore, the
rewrite rules used in πv are included in the ones used in πp and πr , therefore v ∈ Pf ([p]Pm ∪ [r]Pm). 
5.3. A generalized completion procedure
We want to deﬁne a completion procedure through critical proofs. For this, we ﬁrst need some characterizations of the
normal-form proofs and the critical proofs. The limit of this completion procedure will be an equivalent rewrite system
modulo which the sequent calculus admits Cut.
5.3.1. Normal-form proofs and critical proofs in deduction modulo
Proposition 38 (Characterization of normal-form proofs). A proof in the unfolding sequent calculus is in normal form iff it is
either a trivial proof or its ﬁrst component is aCut-free proof with no unneeded logical rules, where Axiom is applied only to atomic
propositions.
Proof. If a proof p in Pf (R) is not a trivial proof, and its ﬁrst component πp possesses a Cut at position p, then using Property
17(c), we know that there exists a Cut-free proof of the sequent  P(  ) in Rew(  ) where    is the conclusion of
πp|p. Using Lemma 3 we obtain a Cut-free proof πq of   . Because πq is Cut-free and πp|p has a Cut at root, the skeleton
of πp|p is greater than the one of πq for the RPO. Replacing πp|p by πq in p using Postulate E, we obtain a smaller proof than
p which is in Pf (ThR) because πq is by assumption in Rew(  ) =⋃a∈Rew()[〈πp|p, a〉]Cl , and each 〈πp|p, a〉 is in Pf (R).
Therefore p cannot be in normal form.
If a proof p is not a trivial proof, and its ﬁrst component πp has a unneeded logical rule at position p, then the direct
subproofs of πp|p shows the same conclusion as πp|p when weakened, and are smaller because an RPO is a simpliﬁcation
ordering and the weakening of a proof does not change its skeleton. By using Postulate E we can obtain a proof smaller than
p, and therefore p cannot be in normal form.
If a proof p is not a trivial proof, and its ﬁrst component apply Axiom to a non-atomic proposition, then it is always possible
to replace this application by some proof where Axiom is applied only to atomic propositions. Given the deﬁnition of the
precedence, this proof is smaller than the original application of Axiom and p is therefore not minimal.
Due to our deﬁnition of the precedence of the RPO, if a non-trivial proof p is notminimal in every presentation of a theory,
i.e. there exists a smaller proof q, then either the ﬁrst component of p contains a Cut, or it applies Axiom on a non-atomic
proposition, or the ﬁrst component of q is a weakened subproof of the one of p, i.e. unneeded rules were applied in p.
A trivial proof in Pf (R) is not comparable with any other proof, in particular in Pf (ThR), so that it is in normal form. 
We give now a characterization of the critical proofs in deduction modulo.
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Proposition 39 (Critical proofs in deduction modulo). Critical proofs in deduction modulo are non-trivial and their ﬁrst
component is of the form
π....
, A, P  
, A   ↑-l(B →
− P1)
π ′....
  Q, A,
  A, ↑-r(C →
+ P2)
   Cut(A)
where
• π and π ′ are Cut-free;
• π and π ′ do not use unneeded logical rules;
• π and π ′ apply Axiom only to atomic propositions;
•  contains only universally quantiﬁed propositions and atomic propositions different from A;
•  contains only existentially quantiﬁed propositions and atomic propositions different from A;
• all propositions of  ∪  are principal proposition either in some Axiom (and not ↑-l nor ↑-r), ∀-l or ∃-r in π or π ′;
• at least one of B →− P1 or C →+ P2 is not a term rewriting.
Proof. We essentially follow the proof of the Hauptsatz of [32, Chapter 13].
Because of Proposition 38, subproofs of a critical proof (which are by deﬁnition in normal form) that are not trivial must
be Cut-free. Furthermore, because a critical proof is not in normal form, then it possesses either a Cut, a unneeded logical
rule or apply Axiom to a non-atomic proposition. In the second and third cases, we can ﬁnd a smaller proof in the same
presentation, contradicting the minimality of critical proofs. Therefore a critical proof has a Cut at its root. It is a proof of the
form
π
{
π1 · · · πn
, P   r
π ′
1
· · · π ′m
  P, r’
}
π ′
   Cut(P),
where π and π ′ are in normal form, so are cut-free, do not use unneeded rules and apply Axiom only to atomic propositions.
Moreover, if A ∈  ∪ , then Cut is unneeded. Furthermore, if  contains a non-atomic proposition which is not universally
quantiﬁed, then either it can be pruned, in which case we can obtain a proof smaller for  which is not in normal form
(It contains a Cut.); or it is the principal proposition of some inference rule (different from ∀-l and ↑-l) in π or π ′. But it is
possible to permute this inference rule with all other inference rules until Cut (see Note 1), in which case we obtain a proof
smaller for > in the same presentation. This is also the case if some atomic proposition is rewritten using ↑-l. For  this is
dual. All propositions in  ∪  are used somewhere, else they could be pruned and we could obtain a proof smaller for 
which would not be in normal form.
In the following, 	 ,	 ′,	1, . . . ,	n,	 ′1, . . . ,	
′
m are proof obtained from π ,π
′,π1, . . . ,πn,π ′1, . . . ,π
′
m by weakening.
We can now check the different cases that can be found in Section 13.2 of [32] (note that we do not have to consider
structural rules in the polarized unfolding sequent calculus):
1. r is Axiom. There are two cases :
• the principal proposition of the Axiom is P, then we have necessarily P ∈  and π ′ is therefore a proof of    which
is smaller than the initial proof, contradicting its minimality;
• the principal proposition of the Axiom is another proposition Q , then Q ∈  and Q ∈ , so that we can build the proof
   Axiom which is smaller than the initial proof, contradicting its minimality.
2. r’ is Axiom. This case is handled as case 1.
3. r is a logical rule other than a left one with principal proposition P. In this case, the conclusion of a subproof πi has the
form i, P  i, because r does not touch P. We can build the proof
	1 	
′
.
.
.
.
.
.
,1, P  ,1 ,1  P,,1
,1  ,1
Cut(P)
	n 	
′
.
.
.
.
.
.
,n, P  ,n ,n  P,,n
,n  ,n
Cut(P)
···········
,  , r
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and then use Lemma 5. If we look at the proof of this lemma,we can showby induction that the skeleton of the contracted
proofs is smaller than the original one for the RPO.We therefore have a smaller proof than the initial proof, contradicting
its minimality.
4. r’ is a logical rule other than a right one with principal proposition P. This case is handled as case 3.
5. Both r and r’ are logical rules, r a left one and r’ a right one, of principal proposition P. This is one of the key cases as
given in Section 13.1 of [32] : by replacing the Cut over P by Cuts over subformulae of P we obtain a smaller proof, thus
contradicting the minimality of the original proof. For instance, if P = P1 ∧ P2, the initial proof
π1....
, P1, P2  
, P1 ∧ P2   ∧-l
π ′
1....
  P1,
π ′
2....
  P2,
  P1 ∧ P2, ∧-r
   Cut(P1 ∧ P2)
is greater than the proof
π1....
, P1, P2  
	 ′
2....
, P1  P2,
, P1   Cut(P2)
π ′
1....
  P1,
   Cut(P1)
6. r or r’ is an unfolding rule applying to another proposition than P. This case can in fact be handled as case 3.
7. r is an unfolding rule and r’ is a logical rule, both applying to P. This case cannot occur, because only atomic propositions
are unfolded, so that no logical rule can be applied to P.
8. r is a logical rule and r’ is an unfolding rule, both applying to P. This case is handled as case 7.
9. r and r’ are both unfolding rules applying to P. Therefore P has to be atomic, and is rewritten by B →− P1 to the left and
C →+ P2 to the right. If both of this rewriting are term rewriting, then, because of conﬂuence of RT (,V), we know that
there is some P′ such that P1
∗−→
RT (,V)
P′ ∗←−
RT (,V)
P2. The proof
π1....
, P1  
, P′  P′, Axiom
, P2  P1, Unfolding Rules
	 ′
1....
  P1, P2,
  P1, Cut(P2)
   Cut(P1)
is smaller than the initial proof (remind that the term rewrite relation is by deﬁnition included in the subformula relation),
contradicting its minimality. Otherwise, we are exactly in the case stated in the theorem. 
Note. Ifwe suppose, as in theorder conditionof [33], that theproposition rewrite system is conﬂuent, and that it is included in
anwell-founded ordering compatiblewith the subformula relation, thenwe can take this ordering instead of the subformula
relation to compare Cuts in the precedence. Doing this, we can prove that there are no minimal proofs of this form, and
consequently no critical proofs. Therefore the admissibility of Cut is veriﬁed, as a by-product of the completion procedure.
The main difference with [33] is that Hermant gives a semantic proof of the admissibility of Cut, whereas we have here
a Cut elimination algorithm, i.e. a terminating syntactical process that transforms a proof into a Cut-free one. It is proved by
Dowek and Werner [34] that such an order condition provides normalization.
The fact that the compatibility of the rewrite systemwith the subformulae relation implies theCut-admissibility was also
independently found by Aiguier, Boin and Longuet [35], with the same kind of ordering over proofs.
Theorem 40 (Undecidability of critical proof search). The problem
Input: A propositional rewrite system R and a sequent   .
Decide if    is the conclusion of a critical proof in R.
is undecidable.
Proof. We reduce to the problem of validity in ﬁrst-order logic.
Let P be a ﬁrst-order proposition.
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Let A, B be atomic propositions not appearing in P. Consider the following propositional rewrite system:{
A →− B
A →+ P .
We can check that B is the conclusion of a critical proof in it if and only if P is valid.
Indeed, a critical proof is necessarily of the form
A, B B Axiom
A  B ↑-l
Proof of P with no ↑-l nor ↑-r
....
P, A, B
A, B ↑-r
 B Cut(A) 
Of course, in the quantiﬁer-free case, this problem is decidable. It remains to be investigated for what fragments of
ﬁrst-order logic it is decidable, in particular if these fragments are the same that for the validity problem.
5.3.2. The completion procedure
As we wrote in Section 5.1, we want to deﬁne a completing deduction mechanism by adding to a presentation A a
presentation C(A) such that Comp(A) ⊆ C(A) ⊆ ThA.
Here, using Property 17(c), we know that for all proofs p whose ﬁrst component is a proof π of a sequent    there
exists a Cut-free proof of the sequent  P(  ) in Rew(  ). Using Lemma 3 we obtain a Cut-free proof π of    in
Rew(  ). If the proof p is critical, π has aCut at its root and thus it is greater than π ′, so that we can use this particular π ′ in
the deﬁnition of Comp. Note that if p is critical, so are the proofswith the sameﬁrst component π but another conclusion (that
is, another rule in Rew(  )). We therefore have to add the premises of π ′, but these premises are in fact in Rew(  ),
and we obtain all Rew(  ) by considering the conclusion of all the critical proofs whose ﬁrst component is π:
Comp(A)
!=
⋃
p∈Crit(A)
[p]Cl.
The best procedure is thus to add only the conclusions of critical proofs. Nevertheless, searching for these conclusions is
undecidable, so that wemust use a superset of them. Herewewill add the conclusion of the proofs in the form of Proposition
39. (Note that this proposition is only a necessary condition for being critical.)
Wemust consider proofs of the formof Proposition 39. Asπ andπ ′ areCut-free and donot use unneeded logical rules, they
could be found using for instance a tableau method modulo, like TaMed [7,10], which is complete with respect to Cut-free
proofs, if we knew  and . The idea is therefore to apply a tableau method for the deduction modulo on A, P  and  A, Q
until they are either proved or the method terminates, and to complete the sequents to close all branches. Of course, the
tableau method may not terminate, in which case we have to arbitrarily decide to stop it. If we stop it too early, then maybe
there remains some open branch that could be closed, and therefore  and  in the critical-proof candidate will not be
minimal. This is not a problem because the generated rewrite rules for this will be more general than the one for the real
critical proof. However, the longer the tableau method runs, the more accurate the additional rules will be.
Then, we have to close all remaining open branches by adding some propositions in  and. We knowwe do not need to
add A. The formulae in  and can be non-atomic formulae, in which case they could be further decomposed by the tableau
method. However, if we use a tableau method with meta-variables (see [36]), the order in which formulas are decomposed
in no longer relevant, only the uniﬁcation of meta-variables is, so that they could have occurred before the decomposition of
A, P  or  A, Q . As Axioms are applied only to atomic propositions, we only need to consider such cases to close the branches,
and then, we may need to recompose the atomic formulae added to the branches to get the actual  and . In particular,
if we added some atomic formula in which there is a variable which was introduced in the proof by some ∃-l or ∀-r (an
Eigenvariable),4 then it cannot appear in  ∪ . It therefore has to be introduced using a quantiﬁcation. For instance, if we
wanted to add B(x) in and x is such an Eigenvariable,we have to add ∀x. B(x) instead.Weneed to do so for all possible choices
of atomic propositions different from A to close the branches, and a priori for all choices of recompositions. Wewould obtain
that way all possible conclusions    of proofs of the form of Proposition 39, and C(A) would be the union of Rew(  )
for each of them. However, it seems that we only need to recompose the formulae to add the quantiﬁcations protecting
the Eigenvariables. Indeed, by applying other recompositions, we obtain sequents    whose rules in Rew(  ) are
redundant w.r.t. the rules obtained without the recomposition—this is due to the fact that Rew is working by decomposing
the formulae in the sequent.
We repeatedly complete the rewrite system until a ﬁxpoint is reached. The limit admits Cut.
4 Working using meta-variables, this would mean that the formula contains a Skolem symbol.
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Theorem 41 (Cut admissibility of the limit). For all sequents   , for all proposition rewrite systems R0,    has a proof in
R0 if and only if it has a Cut-free proof in R∞.
Proof By Proposition 32, we know that our deduction mechanism is completing, and therefore by Theorem 30
ThR0 ⊆ [Pf (R∞) ∩ Nf (R0)]Cl. (1)
The “if” part comes from the fact that we only add rules that corresponds to sequents provable in R0. For the “only if”,
suppose that    has a proof in R0, then using (1) there exists a proof pa of conclusion a in Pf (R∞) ∩ Nf (R0) for all rules
a ∈ Rew(  ). If pa is trivial, then we can use Property 17(c) to ﬁnd a Cut-free proof with the same conclusion, otherwise
Proposition 38 shows that pa is Cut-free. We can therefore conclude with Property 19. 
6. Examples
In the case of Crabbé’s example presented in the introduction, the input is the rewrite system {A →+ B ∧ ¬A;A →− B ∧ ¬A}
and the completion procedure generates B →− ⊥.
With this new rule, we can show that there are no more critical proofs. The proposition rewrite system{
A → B ∧ ¬A
B → ⊥
admits Cut.
The next example deals with quantiﬁers and is extracted from [33]:
r ∈ r → ∀y. y  r ⇒ y ∈ r ⇒ C
where y  z != ∀x. (y ∈ x ⇒ z ∈ x). It is terminating and conﬂuent, but does not admits Cut.
The critical proofs have the form
....
r ∈ r, ∀y. y  r ⇒ y ∈ r ⇒ C 
r ∈ r  ↑-l
....
 r ∈ r, ∀y. y  r ⇒ y ∈ r ⇒ C
 r ∈ r ↑-l
 Cut(r ∈ r) .
The left part can be developed as
r ∈ r, C  r ∈ r  t1 ∈ r
r ∈ r, t1 ∈ r ⇒ C  ⇒ -l
r ∈ r, t1 ∈ z  r ∈ z
r ∈ r  t1 ∈ z ⇒ r ∈ z ⇒ -r
r ∈ r  t1  r ∀-r
r ∈ r, t1  r ⇒ t1 ∈ r ⇒ C  ⇒ -l
r ∈ r, ∀y. y  r ⇒ y ∈ r ⇒ C  ∀-l
and the right part as
r ∈ t0, z ∈ r  r ∈ r, C z ∈ r  z ∈ t0, r ∈ r, C
z ∈ t0 ⇒ r ∈ t0, z ∈ r  r ∈ r, C ⇒ -l
z  r, z ∈ r  r ∈ r, C ∀-l
z  r  r ∈ r, z ∈ r ⇒ C ⇒ -r
 r ∈ r, z  r ⇒ z ∈ r ⇒ C ⇒ -r
 r ∈ r, ∀y. y  r ⇒ y ∈ r ⇒ C ∀-r .
To close the proofs, we can for instance have t0 = r = t1, and C in the right part of the sequent (to close r ∈ r, C ). One can
see that other choices will not produce critical proofs. The resulting sequent is therefore  C, and the added rule is C →+ .
This rule does not generate new critical proofs, and consequently, the proposition rewrite system⎧⎨⎩
r ∈ r →+ ∀y. y  r ⇒ y ∈ r ⇒ C
r ∈ r →− ∀y. y  r ⇒ y ∈ r ⇒ C
C →+ 
admits Cut.
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One can also think of another example, where there remains quantiﬁers in the conclusion: one can replace B by ∃x. ∀y. B ∧
C(x, y) in Crabbé’s example to get the rule: A → (∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y)) ∧ ¬A where A and B are atomic propositions, and C a
predicate of arity 2.
We ﬁrst search for a proof of A, (∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y)) ∧ ¬A , and we get
A, (∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y))  A Axiom(A)
A, (∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y)),¬A  ¬-l
A, (∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y)) ∧ ¬A  ∧-l .
We try do the same for the right part
 ∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B, A  ∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), C(x, y), A
 ∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B ∧ C(x, y), A ∧-r
 ∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), A ∀-r
 ∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), A ∃-r
A  A Axiom(A)
 ¬A, A ¬-r
 (∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y)) ∧ ¬A, A ∧-r
A → (∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y)) ∧ ¬A has already been applied in the right part of the sequent, so it is not useful to do it again, and so
we cannot close the derivation.We see thatwe have to add propositions in the context to close the remaining branches. Aswe
do not add A, and Axiom is only applied to atomic propositions, there remains only the choice to add B in  for the left branch
and C(x, y) in  for the right branch. However, in C(x, y), the variable y is an Eigenvariable, so we need in fact to add ∀y. C(x, y).
Finally, the conclusion of the critical proof is B, ∀y. C(x, y)  which gives for instance the rewrite rule B →− ∀x. ¬∀y. C(x, y).
With this new rule, there are no longer critical proofs. In particularwehave the followingCut-free proof of ∃x. ∀y.B ∧ C(x, y) ,
corresponding to the conclusion B  of the critical proof in the original Crabbé system:
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), C(x, y0), B,∀x. ¬∀y. C(x, y), C(x, y)  C(x, y0) Axiom
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B ∧ C(x, y0), B,∀x. ¬∀y. C(x, y), C(x, y)  C(x, y0) ∧-l
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B,∀x. ¬∀y. C(x, y), C(x, y)  C(x, y0) ∀-l
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B,∀x. ¬∀y. C(x, y), C(x, y)  ∀y. C(x, y) ∀-r
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B,∀x. ¬∀y. C(x, y),¬∀y. C(x, y), C(x, y)  ¬-l
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B,∀x. ¬∀y. C(x, y), C(x, y)  ∀-l
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B, C(x, y)  ↑-l
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y), B ∧ C(x, y)  ∧-l
∀y. B ∧ C(x, y)  ∀-l
∃x. ∀y. B ∧ C(x, y)  ∃-l .
In these three examples, only one step was needed to produce a complete system. But the system
R =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
A →− B
A →+ C
D →− B
D →+ E
may need two steps to produce the completed system
R ∪
⎧⎨⎩
B →− C
B →+ E
C →+ E
.
Indeed, the ﬁrst two rules of R create the critical proof
B, A, C  C Axiom
B, A  C ↑-l
B  A, B, C Axiom
B  A, C ↑-r
B  C Cut(A)
that leads for instance to the rewrite rule B →− C. Similarly the two other rules may complete the system by the rewrite rule
B →+ E. Consequently, after one step the system has a critical proof
E, B, C  C Axiom
E, B  C ↑-l
E  B, E, C Axiom
E  B, C ↑-r
E  C Cut(B)
and may be completed by the rewrite rule C →+ E.
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We nevertheless conjecture that if the initial proposition rewrite system is conﬂuent, the completion procedure is
terminating, possibly in one step.
7. Conclusion and perspectives
This paper reveals a deep logical correspondence between the sequent calculus, proof orderings and completion. We
have ﬁrst shown the boundaries of the research for an optimal criterion which ensures the Cut admissibility of a rewrite
system by proving its undecidability in general. Then, we have proposed how to circumvent this issue by transforming
the rewrite systems we are working with into an equivalent one which admits Cut. This is done by setting the right
abstract canonical system structure on the proof space of the unfolding sequent calculus modulo, which is equivalent to
the asymmetric sequent calculus modulo, in particular concerning Cut admissibility. This permits to use abstract comple-
tion to recover the admissibility of Cut. This abstract completion is precise enough to be operational, and it is actually
implemented, based on a prototype of the tableau method modulo TaMed [10], and coded in the language TOM+OCaml
[http://tom.loria.fr/, http://caml.inria.fr/ocaml/index.en.html]. The implementation is available on the SVN distribution of
TOM (see http://gforge.inria.fr/scm/?group_id=78) in the directory trunk/jtom/application/completion. Note that because
the implemented tableau method is for non-polarized deduction modulo, the completion procedure adds non-polarized
rewrite rules thanks to the translation ·∓ given in Section 2.2 before Proposition 9.
All this opens many questions that we are now considering.
The limit of the completion procedure admits Cut in the polarized sequent calculus, and therefore we can translate it
by Corollary 8 and Proposition 9 into a non-polarized rewrite system that admits Cut in the asymmetric sequent calculus
modulo. However, this systemmay be non-conﬂuent, sowe do not know if it admitsCut in the original version of the sequent
calculus modulo of [4]. However, if we begin with a conﬂuent rewrite system R0, then the original sequent calculus modulo
R0 is equivalent to the asymmetric sequent calculus modulo R
∓∞ without Cut. This is exactly what we wanted, since the
asymmetric sequent calculus modulo without Cut is analytic, in the sense that rewriting is oriented from the bottom to
the top of proofs, which induces that the asymmetric sequent calculus modulo is well adapted for proof search. The usual
restriction of deduction modulo to conﬂuent rewrite system was mainly imposed to be able to check the congruence using
only rewritings, and is no longer needed as far as we know that the ﬁnal system prove the same that the original one.
The ordering on proofs we are using is adapted to consider Cut admissibility as a normal-form property of an ACS,
but produces too many critical proofs, in particular when quantiﬁers are involved, because some of the rules produced
by the completion procedure subsumes other ones. (For instance A →+ ∃x. P(x) subsumes A →+ P(t) for a particular t ∈
T (, V).) This ordering has therefore to be reﬁned in order to restrict oneself to the more relevant critical proofs.
Furthermore, our procedure can be used to determine if a system admits Cut. Indeed, if a proposition rewrite system is a
ﬁxpoint of this procedure, then we know that it admits Cut. Nevertheless, the converse is not true, essentially because we
have to use a superset of the critical proofs. It will be interesting to check what results this procedure will give on system
that are proved to admits Cut, like Higher Order Logic [37] or arithmetic [38], or for systems for which the admissibility of
Cut is unknown yet, such as Pure Type Systems [39].
Indeed, we have shown that the Rew algorithm provides a constructive way to transform a ﬁrst-order theory into a
proposition rewrite system. Up to efﬁciency questions, this closes the problem of transforming proofs in a theory into proofs
modulo, i.e. to replace deduction steps by computational ones. What remains still open and challenging is to understand
how to systematically build ﬁrst-order theories out of general ones (e.g. HOL or arithmetic) and how to balance the amount
of computations on term versus the one on propositions.
Moreover, our procedure only guarantees the admissibility of Cut, and does not provide a Cut elimination procedure. In
other words, we do not have a process that transform proofs with Cuts to Cut-free ones, so that we have to build the Cut-free
proofs from scratch. In particular, for the completed system, normalization may not hold. For instance, with Crabbé’s rule,
once the system is completed, the initial proof of B  can still be constructed, and it is still not normalizing, i.e. the λ-term that
is associated to the proof can be inﬁnitely β-reduced.We can notice that, even if Cut is admissible, the proof of Proposition 39
does not give a cut elimination procedure: we know that there are no critical proofs, but we do not know how to transform a
proof in the form of Proposition 39 into a smaller one (without building a Cut-free proof from scratch). We probably have to
introduce some simpliﬁcation rules in order to suppress the possibility to build non-normalizing proofs. For instance, in our
example,wecould simplifyA → B ∧ ¬A intoA → ⊥ ∧ ¬AusingB → ⊥, and then simplify it toA → ⊥, the system {A → ⊥; B →
⊥} being normalizing. Besides, with such simpliﬁcation rules, we may obtain the canonical presentation of the system.
Lastly, it will be interesting to understand how the results presented here can be transferred to intuitionistic logic. In
particular, the impossibility to build a Rew function without breaking the witness property shows that it is not trivial. We
tackle this issue in [26].
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